Central Banker Contracts, Incomplete Information, and Monetary Policy Surprises: In Search of a Selfish Central Banker?

Author： Chortareas G.E.   Miller S.M.  

Publisher： Springer Publishing Company

ISSN： 0048-5829

Source： Public Choice, Vol.116, Iss.3-4, 2003-09, pp. : 271-295

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