Are there any incorrigible empirical statements? 1 There is an excellent discussion of this question in A. J. Ayer's The Problem of Knowledge , Chapter 2, Sections (iv), (v), and (vi), which mentions almost all the relevant considerations. However, it seems to me to stress some of the less important points and merely to mention what I regard as the crucial argument. I refer to this discussion by the pages in the Pelican edition. The case against incorrigibility is argued also by J. L. Austin (against John Wisdom) in ‘Other Minds', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society , Supplementary Volume XX, reprinted in Austin's Philosophical Papers ; I refer to the pages in the latter publication. The question is raised again by the controversy between J. J. C. Smart and Kurt Baier about the status of pains and other sensations in A.J.P. , Vol. 40, No. 1, May, 1962.

Author： Mackie J.L.  

Publisher： Routledge Ltd

ISSN： 0004-8402

Source： Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol.41, Iss.1, 1963-01, pp. : 12-28

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