An Analysis of Some of J. J. C. Smart's Objections to the ‘Proofs’

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

E-ISSN: 1469-901x|4|2|245-251

ISSN: 0034-4125

Source: Religious Studies, Vol.4, Iss.2, 1969-04, pp. : 245-251

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Abstract

I submit as a good rule of thumb (but one which is sometimes wrong) that if a discussion of any major philosophical position or proposition ends with the conclusion that that position or proposition is ‘absurd’ or ‘meaningless’ then a mistake has been made in the discussion. The mistake often turns out to be the accuser's failure to appreciate precisely what the position being attacked really is.

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