The strategic logic of costly punishment necessitates natural field experiments, and at least one such experiment exists

Publisher： Cambridge University Press

E-ISSN： 1469-1825|35|1|31-32

ISSN： 0140-525x

Source： Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Vol.35, Iss.1, 2012-01, pp. : 31-32

Disclaimer: Any content in publications that violate the sovereignty, the constitution or regulations of the PRC is not accepted or approved by CNPIEC.

Previous Menu Next

Abstract

Related content

The punishment that sustains cooperation is often coordinated and costly

By  

Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Vol. 35, Iss. 1, 2012-01 ,pp. : 20-21

Cambridge University Press

Access to resources Recommend Favorite

Strong reciprocity is real, but there is no evidence that uncoordinated costly punishment sustains cooperation in the wild

By  

Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Vol. 35, Iss. 1, 2012-01 ,pp. : 45-59

Cambridge University Press

Access to resources Recommend Favorite

In the lab and the field: Punishment is rare in equilibrium

By  

Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Vol. 35, Iss. 1, 2012-01 ,pp. : 26-28

Cambridge University Press

Access to resources Recommend Favorite

The restorative logic of punishment: Another argument in favor of weak selection

By  

Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Vol. 35, Iss. 1, 2012-01 ,pp. : 17-18

Cambridge University Press

Access to resources Recommend Favorite

Punishment as a mechanism to maintain bilateral cooperation: A social behavior experiment

By  

Social Behavior and Personality: An international journal, Vol. 42, Iss. 9, 2014-10 ,pp. : 1445-1456

Scientific Journal Publishers

Access to resources Recommend Favorite