Knowledge of Grammar and Concept Possession

ISSN： 0007-0882

Source： British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol.63, Iss.3, 2012-09, pp. : 577-606

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Abstract

This article deals with the cognitive relationship between a speaker and her internal grammar. In particular, it takes issue with the view that such a relationship is one of belief or knowledge (I call this view the Propositional Attitude View, or PAV). I first argue that PAV entails that all ordinary speakers (tacitly) possess technical concepts belonging to syntactic theory, and second, that most ordinary speakers do not in fact possess such concepts. Thus, it is concluded that speakers do not literally know or believe much of the contents of their grammars, and moreover, that these contents can only be attributed at a subpersonal level. 1The Propositional Attitude View of Linguistic Competence2The Argument from Concept Possession2.1Motivation2.2The argument3Premise 1: Concepts, Thoughts, and Persons4Premise 2: Nave Speakers Lack the Required Concepts4.1The search for a criterion of tacit concept attribution4.2Tacit attitudes, tacit concepts, and cognitive dispositions4.3Domain crossing and its manifestations4.4The domain-crossing criterion4.5Domain crossing and tacit concepts4.6Domain crossing and grammatical concepts4.7Summing up5Objections5.1Grammatical concepts cross domains5.2Objection: concept talk is pleonastic6Conclusion