Color And The Duplication Assumption

ISSN： 0039-7857

Source： Synthese, Vol.129, Iss.1, 2001-10, pp. : 61-77

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Abstract

Susan Hurley has attacked the `Duplication Assumption', the assumption that creatures with exactly the same internal states could function exactly alike in environments that are systematically distorted. She argues that the dynamical interdependence of action and perception is highly problematic for the Duplication Assumption when it involves spatial states and capacities, whereas no such problems arise when it involves color states and capacities. I will try to establish that the Duplication Assumption makes even less sense for lightness than for some of the spatial cases. This is due not only to motor factors, but to the basic physical asymmetry between black and white. I then argue that the case can be extended from lightness perception to hue perception. Overall, the aims of this paper are: (1) to extend Susan Hurley's critique of the Duplication Assumption; (2) to argue against highly constrained versions of Inverted Spectrum arguments; (3) to propose a broader conception of the vehicle for color perception.