Strategy-proof division of a private good when preferences are single-dipped

Author： Sloan D.M.   Strauss M.E.   Quirk S.W.   Sajatovic M.   Klaus B.   Peters H.   Storcken T.  

Publisher： Elsevier

ISSN： 0165-1765

Source： Economics Letters, Vol.55, Iss.3, 1997-09, pp. : 339-346

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