Coalitional Strategy-Proofness in Economies with Single-Dipped Preferences and the Assignment of an Indivisible Object

Author： Klaus B.  

Publisher： Elsevier

ISSN： 0899-8256

Source： Games and Economic Behavior, Vol.34, Iss.1, 2001-01, pp. : 64-82

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