The probability of a Condorcet winner with a small number of voters

Author： Gehrlein W.V.  

Publisher： Elsevier

ISSN： 0165-1765

Source： Economics Letters, Vol.59, Iss.3, 1998-06, pp. : 317-321

Disclaimer: Any content in publications that violate the sovereignty, the constitution or regulations of the PRC is not accepted or approved by CNPIEC.

Previous Menu Next

Abstract

Related content

A generalization of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem to weighted voting games with many small voters

By Lindner Ines  

Economic Theory, Vol. 35, Iss. 3, 2008-06 ,pp. : 607-611

Springer Publishing Company

Access to resources Recommend Favorite

The Probability of Condorcet Cycles and SuperMajority Rules

By Balasko Y.   Cres H.  

Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 75, Iss. 2, 1997-08 ,pp. : 237-270

Academic Press

Access to resources Recommend Favorite

The probability that all weighted scoring rules elect the same winner

By Gehrlein W.V.   Lepelley D.  

Economics Letters, Vol. 66, Iss. 2, 2000-02 ,pp. : 191-197

Elsevier

Access to resources Recommend Favorite

Condorcet meets Ellsberg

By  

THEORETICAL ECONOMICS, Vol. 11, Iss. 3, 2016-09 ,pp. : 865-895

John Wiley & Sons Inc

Access to resources Recommend Favorite

Condorcet's paradox for weak preference orderings

By Lepelley D.   Martin M.  

European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 17, Iss. 1, 2001-03 ,pp. : 163-177

Elsevier

Access to resources Recommend Favorite