Author： Gehrlein W.V. Lepelley D.
Publisher： Elsevier
ISSN： 0165-1765
Source： Economics Letters, Vol.66, Iss.2, 2000-02, pp. : 191-197
Disclaimer: Any content in publications that violate the sovereignty, the constitution or regulations of the PRC is not accepted or approved by CNPIEC.
Abstract
Related content
Scoring rules: an alternative parameterization
By Baharad Eyal
Economic Theory, Vol. 30, Iss. 1, 2007-01 ,pp. :
Access to resources
Recommend
The probability of a Condorcet winner with a small number of voters
Economics Letters, Vol. 59, Iss. 3, 1998-06 ,pp. :
Strong Condorcet efficiency of scoring rules
Economics Letters, Vol. 68, Iss. 2, 2000-08 ,pp. :
The Network of Weighted Majority Rules and Weighted Majority Games
By Karotkin D.
Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 22, Iss. 2, 1998-02 ,pp. :
Affirmative action in winner-take-all markets
The Journal of Economic Inequality, Vol. 3, Iss. 3, 2005-12 ,pp. :