Credible equilibria in non-finite games and ingames without perfect recall

Author： Corcho Sánchez P. Ferreira García J.L.

ISSN： 0254-5330

Source： Annals of Operations Research, Vol.84, Iss.1, 1998-01, pp. : 167-185

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