Markov Perfect Equilibria for a classof capital accumulation games

Author： Dockner E.J.   Plank M.   Nishimura K.  

Publisher： Springer Publishing Company

ISSN： 0254-5330

Source： Annals of Operations Research, Vol.89, Iss.1, 1999-01, pp. : 215-230

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