Publisher： Academic Press
ISSN： 0022-0531
Source： Journal of Economic Theory, Vol.105, Iss.2, 2002-08, pp. : 450-468
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Abstract
We analyze the role of cheap-talk in two player games with one-sided incomplete information. We identify conditions under which (1) players can fully communicate and coordinate on efficient Nash equilibria of the underlying complete information game; and (2) players cannot communicate so cheap-talk does not alter the equilibrium set of the Bayesian game. We present examples that illustrate several issues that arise when there is two-sided incomplete information.
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