Fair, Efficient and Envy-Free Bargaining: An Experimental Test of the Brams-Taylor Adjusted Winner Mechanism

ISSN： 0926-2644

Source： Group Decision and Negotiation, Vol.14, Iss.3, 2005-05, pp. : 241-264

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