Author: Hayes K.J. Razzolini L. Ross L.B.
Publisher: Springer Publishing Company
ISSN: 0048-5829
Source: Public Choice, Vol.94, Iss.1-2, 1998-01, pp. : 1-20
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Abstract
Local governments' allocation decisions are modeled in the context of a slack maximizing bureaucrat who produces public goods according to a production function that includes both provision and the constituents' socio-economic characteristics. To gain a better understanding of the determinants of slack, comparative statics and an empirical study of Illinois municipalities are conducted. The indirect output distance function provides efficiency scores upon which we regress several variables, representing socio-economic characteristics, costs and competition measures. We find that slack or inefficient behavior is associated with richer communities, lower education levels and a lack of competition for residents among municipalities.
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