STRATEGIC EXCLUSION OF THE HIGHEST-VALUED BIDDERS IN WHOLESALE AUTOMOBILE AUCTIONS

Author： HAMMOND ROBERT G. MORRILL THAYER

ISSN： 0095-2583

Source： Economic Inquiry, Vol.52, Iss.3, 2014-07, pp. : 1219-1230

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