The Argument from Design—a Reply to R. G. Swinburne1

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

E-ISSN: 1469-901x|7|4|361-373

ISSN: 0034-4125

Source: Religious Studies, Vol.7, Iss.4, 1971-12, pp. : 361-373

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Abstract

Of all the arguments for the existence of God, the argument from design is in many respects the most impressive, as everyone remarks that Kant remarked. Certainly it is an argument which seems to have appealed to the popular imagination and even today does not lack philosophical proponents. The purpose of the present paper is to examine a recent formulation of the argument. In particular I shall be concerned to bring into the open its dualist assumptions and to show how these militate against its general plausibility.