On the value of participation: endogenous emergence of social norms in a three-player ultimatum game experiment

ISSN： 1865-1704

Source： International Review of Economics, Vol.55, Iss.1-2, 2008-04, pp. : 127-147

Disclaimer: Any content in publications that violate the sovereignty, the constitution or regulations of the PRC is not accepted or approved by CNPIEC.

Previous Menu Next

Abstract

Related content

Second Mover Disadvantages in a Three-Player Stackelberg Game with Private Information

By Shinkai T.

Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 90, Iss. 2, 2000-02 ,pp. : 293-304

Academic Press

Access to resources Recommend Favorite

Optimal Contracting with Endogenous Social Norms

By Fischer Paul Huddart Steven

The American Economic Review, Vol. 98, Iss. 4, 2008-09 ,pp. : 1459-1475

American Economic Association

Access to resources Recommend Favorite

Tests of Fairness Models Based on Equity Considerations in a Three-Person Ultimatum Game

By Kagel J.H.

Experimental Economics, Vol. 4, Iss. 3, 2001-12 ,pp. : 203-219

Springer Publishing Company

Access to resources Recommend Favorite

A note on three-player noncooperative bargaining with restricted pairwise meetings

By Calvo-Armengol A.

Economics Letters, Vol. 65, Iss. 1, 1999-10 ,pp. : 47-54

Elsevier

Access to resources Recommend Favorite

Spatial Evolution of Social Norms in a Common-Pool Resource Game

By Noailly Joëlle Withagen Cees Bergh Jeroen

Environmental and Resource Economics, Vol. 36, Iss. 1, 2007-01 ,pp. : 113-141

Springer Publishing Company

Access to resources Recommend Favorite