Using all bids in parametric estimation of first-price auctions

Author： Li T.   Vuong Q.  

Publisher： Elsevier

ISSN： 0165-1765

Source： Economics Letters, Vol.55, Iss.3, 1997-09, pp. : 321-325

Disclaimer: Any content in publications that violate the sovereignty, the constitution or regulations of the PRC is not accepted or approved by CNPIEC.

Previous Menu Next

Abstract

Related content

Replacing Sample Trimming with Boundary Correction in Nonparametric Estimation of First‐Price Auctions

By  

JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMETRICS, Vol. 30, Iss. 5, 2015-08 ,pp. : 739-762

John Wiley & Sons Inc

Access to resources Recommend Favorite

Rationalizable bidding in first-price auctions

By Battigalli P.   Siniscalchi M.  

Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 45, Iss. 1, 2003-10 ,pp. : 38-72

Elsevier

Access to resources Recommend Favorite

Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints

By Yeon-Koo C.   Gale I.  

Economics Letters, Vol. 50, Iss. 3, 1996-03 ,pp. : 373-379

Elsevier

Access to resources Recommend Favorite

Empirical Industrial Organization Identification and Estimation of Bidders' Risk Aversion in First-Price Auctions

By Perrigne Isabelle   Vuong Quang  

The American Economic Review, Vol. 97, Iss. 2, 2007-05 ,pp. : 444-448

American Economic Association

Access to resources Recommend Favorite

Low and high types in asymmetric first-price auctions

By Fibich G.   Gavious A.   Sela A.  

Economics Letters, Vol. 75, Iss. 2, 2002-04 ,pp. : 283-287

Elsevier

Access to resources Recommend Favorite