Information acquisition, political game and the delegation of authority

Author： Laffont J.-J.   Zantman W.  

Publisher： Elsevier

ISSN： 0176-2680

Source： European Journal of Political Economy, Vol.18, Iss.3, 2002-09, pp. : 407-428

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