Dispersed communication by central bank committees and the predictability of monetary policy decisions

Author： Ehrmann Michael Fratzscher Marcel

ISSN： 0048-5829

Source： Public Choice, Vol.157, Iss.1-2, 2013-10, pp. : 223-244

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