Enduring Inefficiencies in Counterintelligence by Reducing Type I and Type II Errors Through Parallel Systems: A Principal-Agent Typology

Author： Calista Donald J.  

Publisher： Routledge Ltd

ISSN： 1521-0561

Source： International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol.27, Iss.1, 2014-03, pp. : 109-131

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