Strategy‐proofness and efficiency with non‐quasi‐linear preferences: A characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule

Publisher： John Wiley & Sons Inc

E-ISSN： 1555-7561|10|2|445-487

ISSN： 1933-6837

Source： THEORETICAL ECONOMICS, Vol.10, Iss.2, 2015-05, pp. : 445-487

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